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I. INTRODUCTION 
Domestic constitutions may be the best way to protect refugees 
in an era where the international refugee protection system has failed 
so miserably.1 A system that was already in disrepair prior to the 
Syrian crisis of 2015-16 has only deteriorated since. Its inability to 
adequately protect approximately 22.5 million refugees around the 
world—the largest number since World War II—has been well 
documented.2 These failings include, but are certainly not limited to, 
desperately underfunded humanitarian assistance programs, nearly 
universal disregard for the socioeconomic rights of refugees protected 
under international law, and inadequate and inconsistent refugee 
determination processes in various countries.3 As a result, the world’s 
refugees lack most of the legal, social, and economic guarantees to 
which they are entitled under international law. 
                                                                                                                                  
1. For a review of the critiques of the international refugee protection system, see 
generally ALEXANDER BETTS & PAUL COLLIER, REFUGE: RETHINKING REFUGEE POLICY IN A 
CHANGING WORLD (2017). 
2. See Figures at a Glance, UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (“UNHCR”),  
(June 19, 2017), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/figures-at-a-glance.html; see also Maryellen 
Fullerton, Asylum Crisis Italian Style: The Dublin Regulation Collides with European Human 
Rights Law, 29 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 57, 60 (2016); Lispeth Guild, Does the EU Need a 
European Migration and Protection Agency? 28 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 585, 586 (2016); 
Global Trends: Forced Displacement in 2015, UNHCR, p. 5 (2016), 
http://www.unhcr.org/576408cd7. Refugees are only a subset of the unprecedented sixty-five 
million displaced persons around the world. Id. Most people who are forced to flee their homes 
because of persecution, war, famine, or environmental disaster do not cross the border into 
another country. See generally BETTS & COLLIER, supra note 1. 
3. BETTS & COLLIER, supra note 1, at 7-8. The authors note that contrary to popular 
belief, most refugees around the world live in urban areas rather than in camps, in the Middle 
East and sub-Saharan Africa rather than in Europe, and are often left unsupported by their host 
countries. Id. Under the Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee 
Convention”), refugees are entitled to the right to health care, education, employment, and 
other socioeconomic benefits, but these often go unfulfilled. See generally Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T. 6577, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 
[hereinafter Refugee Convention]. The Refugee Convention was limited both temporally and 
geographically, applying only to refugees who had been displaced by World War II. Id. at art. 
I(A)(2). It was seen as a temporary measure to deal with that particular refugee crisis. 
Subsequent geopolitical events, such as the decolonization movement in Africa and the 
refugee migrations resulting from it, made it obvious that the world’s refugee problem was 
neither temporary nor confined to Europe. DEBORAH ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE 
UNITED STATES 2 n.1 (2014) (explaining the context of the creation of the Protocol). Hence, 
the Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (“1967 Protocol”) removed the temporal and 
geographic restrictions from the Refugee Convention. See Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees art. 1, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6233, 660 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol].  
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In this article I analyze the circumstances under which a 
constitutionalized right to asylum could assist refugees seeking relief 
from harm. This analysis will include an exploration of the emerging 
importance of the constitutionalization of asylum law in some parts of 
the world, primarily the Global South4, and how lawyers in other 
parts of the world, primarily Europe, might make better use of a 
constitutional right to asylum in protecting clients in the midst of 
large refugee migrations.5 In making this argument, I will draw on the 
findings from my recent study of a case before the Constitutional 
Court of Ecuador, in which both domestic and transnational cause 
lawyers utilized the constitutional right to asylum to protect their 
clients.6 For, as Rosalind Dixon and Tom Ginsburg have noted, 
constitutions are often aspirational statements of ideals or reflections 
of conflict between a state’s political actors; whether they have any 
real meaning in democratic societies depends on whether they 
“promote greater democratic consciousness, debate, dialogue and 
                                                                                                                                  
4.  The Global South is most easily understood as developing countries, what was 
formerly referred to as the “Third World.” Caroline Levander & Walter Mignolo, 
Introduction: The Global South and World Dis/Order, 5 Global South 1, 2-4 (2011). It is 
thought of as “those parts of the world that have experienced the most political, social, and 
economic upheaval, and which have suffered the brunt of the greatest challenges, facing the 
world under globalization.” Alfred J .López, Preface & Acknowledgements, 1 Global South v 
(2007). The descriptor refers to “cultures ranging from Africa, Central and Latin America, 
much of Asia, and even those ‘Souths’ within a larger perceived North, such as the U.S. South, 
the Caribbean, and Mediterranean Europe.” Id. 
5. “Constitutionalization” here refers to “a process through which [a] congress, a 
constitutional assembly, and national or international judges grant international human rights 
treaties constitutional rank.” Manuel Eduardo Góngora-Mera, The Block of Constitutionality as 
the Doctrinal Pivot of a Ius Commune, in TRANSFORMATIVE CONSTITUTIONALISM IN LATIN 
AMERICA 237 (Armin Von Bogdandy et al., eds., 2017). In some cases, this is accomplished 
through an explicit reference to a particular treaty in a national constitution.  In other cases, it 
is accomplished through a more general reference to all international human rights instruments 
ratified or otherwise acceded to by a state.  And still in other cases it involves adopting certain 
provisions from a particular human rights treaty rather than the entire treaty. See id. at 235-53; 
see also Stephen Meili, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens: Constitutionalized Treaty Law in 
Ecuador, 31 GEORGE IMMIGR. L. J. 347, 348 n.5 (2017). 
6. See Meili, supra note 5, at 349. Cause lawyering refers to lawyers who advocate on 
behalf of individual clients as well as larger causes. See STUART SCHEINGOLD & AUSTIN 
SARAT, SOMETHING TO BELIEVE IN: POLITICS, PROFESSIONALISM AND CAUSE LAWYERING 
(2004). The Ecuador case study is an example of the liberal trend in asylum practices in Latin 
America over the past thirty years, which stands in contrast to the more restrictive refugee 
policies enacted in the Global North during the same period. See David Cantor, Bucking the 
Trend? Liberalism and Illiberalism in Latin American Refugee Law and Policy, in A LIBERAL 
TIDE? IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM LAW AND POLICY IN LATIN AMERICA 185, 195 (David 
James Cantor et al., eds., 2015). 
386 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:383 
mobilization around issues of social, economic and political justice.”7 
In this article, I will explore the circumstances under which the 
constitutionalized right to asylum might help mobilize refugee 
lawyers to provide greater protection for their clients. In so doing, I 
mean to explore whether constitutional asylum, in Europe in 
particular, has any real meaning, or whether it is merely a series of 
words on a page. 
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between 
constitutional asylum and typical statutory asylum law. In most cases, 
the latter is the result of a state incorporating into its domestic law the 
Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (“Refugee 
Convention”), which limits asylum to those who can demonstrate a 
well-founded fear of persecution on account of at least one of the five 
enumerated grounds: race, religion, nationality, political opinion, or 
membership in a particular social group.8 Most of the 148 states party 
to the Refugee Convention or its Protocol Relating to the Status of 
Refugees (“1967 Protocol”) have developed administrative and civil 
court processes for adjudicating asylum claims under the Refugee 
Convention.9 Constitutional asylum, on the other hand, is provided to 
asylum seekers under only thirty-five percent of the world's national 
constitutions, and utilized far less frequently by asylum seekers and 
their advocates than protection under the Refugee Convention.10 The 
                                                                                                                                  
7. Rosalind Dixon & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative Constitutional Law in Latin America: 
An Introduction, in COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN LATIN AMERICA 1, 5 (Rosalind 
Dixon & Tom Ginsburg eds., 2017). 
8. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2) (“For the purposes of the present 
Convention, the term “refugee” shall apply to any person who . . . owing to well-founded fear 
of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social 
group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to 
such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a 
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such 
events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.”). 
9. See States Parties to the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the 
1967 Protocol, UNHCR (Apr. 2015), http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/protection/basic/3b73b0d63
/states-parties-1951-convention-its-1967-protocol.html; see also Refugee Status 
Determination, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/en-us/refugee-status-determination.html 
[https://perma.cc/23EQ-48JZ] (last visited Jan. 23, 2018).  
10. See Lucas Kowalczyk & Mila Versteeg, The Political Economy of the Constitutional 
Right to Asylum, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1219, 1244 (2017). A constitutional right to asylum is 
significant for many reasons, especially that there is some question about whether such a right 
exists in international law. See, e.g., María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum as a General Principle of 
International Law, 27 INT’L J. OF REFUGEE L. 3 (2015). Article 14 of the non-binding 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”) contains such a right, G.A. Res. 217 (III) 
A, art. 14 (Dec. 10, 1948) (“Everyone has the right to seek and to enjoy in other countries 
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protection offered under these constitutions is generally broader than 
the five specific bases for protection enumerated in the Refugee 
Convention.11 Nevertheless, and despite its potential for assisting 
refugees whose reasons for fleeing their homeland fall outside the 
scope of the Refugee Convention, the constitutional right to asylum 
has been utilized infrequently. Most asylum claims are decided under 
the Refugee Convention.12 Thus, one of the two puzzles explored by 
this article is why constitutional asylum is not more frequently 
utilized by cause lawyers and other advocates for refugees.13 The 
other puzzle concerns the circumstances under which constitutional 
asylum has been used effectively, and whether those are generalizable 
to other national contexts. 
An emphasis on the constitutional right to asylum is particularly 
important in an era of growing nationalism, where state governments 
are becoming increasingly skeptical of globalization and other 
manifestations of what they and their constituents view as 
international pressure on domestic decision making. In such an 
environment, a constitutionalized right to asylum cannot be 
characterized as an imposition from an international body or treaty; 
rather, it is the law of the land. As such, it is less vulnerable to a 
                                                                                                                                  
asylum from persecution.”), but the Refugee Convention, supra note 3, which is a binding 
international treaty, does not. Rather, it sets out a definition of refugee status and lists the 
rights that attach once an individual meets that definition. However, Gil-Bazo concludes that it 
is a general principle of international law after considering its prevalence in a variety of 
international instruments and national constitutions. 
11. Examples of the different ways that the right to asylum is phrased in various 
constitutions is discussed in Part V of this article, infra. 
12. The other main category of relief for asylum seekers is subsidiary, also known as 
complementary protection, which is available to asylum seekers who fail to meet the definition 
of a refugee under the Refugee Convention but may be eligible for relief under human rights 
treaties not specifically designed to protect refugees, such as the Convention Against Torture, 
the Convention on the Rights of the Child, or the European Convention on Human Rights. See 
generally JANE MCADAM, COMPLIMENTARY PROTECTION UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAw 
(2007). 
13.  See Scheingold & Sarat, supra note 6. Sarat and Scheingold edited five volumes 
about cause lawyering between 1998 and 2008; see also Debra Schleef, Book Review of Cause 
Lawyers and Social Movements, 41 L. & SOC’Y REV. 503 (2007). See generally CAUSE 
LAWYERING: POLITICAL COMMITMENTS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES (Austin Sarat 
& Stuart Scheingold eds., 1998); CAUSE LAWYERING AND THE STATE IN A GLOBAL ERA 
(Austin Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2001); THE WORLD CAUSE LAWYERS MAKE (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2005); CAUSE LAWYERS AND SOCIAL MOVEMENTS (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2006); THE CULTURAL LIVES OF CAUSE LAWYERS (Austin 
Sarat & Stuart Scheingold eds., 2008).  
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nationalist critique than the application of international treaties that a 
particular state has ratified. 
This article is organized as follows: Part II sets out its theoretical 
framework, with references to the relevant literature, which it intends 
to supplement. Part III discusses the exponential increase in the right 
to asylum in the world’s constitutions over the past few decades. Part 
IV reviews an example from Latin America of the use of 
constitutionalized human rights law by cause lawyers in protecting 
refugees. Part V analyzes the possibility of a greater use of a 
constitutionalized right to asylum in Europe, specifically in France 
and Italy. Part VI explores the prospects for a more robust utilization 
of the constitutional right to asylum throughout the world. Part VII 
contains concluding remarks.   
II. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
The constitutionalized right to asylum is under-analyzed in the 
vast literature on refugee protection. Most legal scholarship on 
refugees understandably focuses on the principle source of 
international refugee protection, namely, the Refugee Convention.14 
As noted above, a person is recognized as a refugee under the 
Refugee Convention, and thus eligible for protection from the host 
state, if the person has a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of specifically enumerated grounds.15 A vast majority of the world’s 
countries, including those who host most of the world’s refugees, 
have ratified the Refugee Convention and have incorporated it into 
their domestic law, which means it can be enforced by domestic 
courts.16 
Much of the scholarship on refugee law criticizes the Refugee 
Convention for a variety of reasons.17 For one, because the definition 
                                                                                                                                  
14. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3. For a summary of this scholarship, see 
Kowalczyk and Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1223, nn.13 & 14. For an example of the overall 
analysis of the Refugee Convention, see GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL & JANE MCADAM, THE 
REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2007), and JAMES HATHAWAY & MICHELLE 
FOSTER, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS (2d ed. 2014). 
15. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2). 
16. See Stephen Meili, Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum-Seekers?: Lessons from 
the United Kingdom, 48 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 123 (2015) (noting that one of the most 
important factors associated with human rights treaty effectiveness is incorporation into 
domestic law). See also supra note 9.  
17. For a summary of these criticisms, see Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 
1223, nn.13 & 14. 
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of refugee under the Refugee Convention explicitly references those 
individually targeted for persecution, it does not include those who 
flee conditions of general harm or danger, including armed conflict or 
the effects of climate change.18 Another common criticism of the 
Refugee Convention is that its terms are vague and undefined, leaving 
much room for interpretation by individual states that could be driven 
by political interests rather than a moral obligation to protect 
refugees.19 Others fault the Refugee Convention for placing the onus 
of refugee protection on individual states, rather than on a more 
collective approach that would allow for burden-sharing among 
states.20 
Until recently, very few scholars had addressed the 
constitutionalized right to asylum as an alternative to the Refugee 
Convention. This is not terribly surprising given that (1) the main 
source of protection for asylum seekers is the Refugee Convention, 
and (2) far fewer states have included the right to asylum in their 
constitutions than have ratified the Refugee Convention or 1967 
Protocol.21 But in part because of the criticisms of the Refugee 
Convention, a few scholars have turned their attention to the 
constitutionalized right to asylum as an alternative form of relief for 
refugees. For example, Lucas Kowalczyk and Mila Versteeg note that 
when the right to asylum is included in a state’s constitution, as 
opposed to merely included in its statutory law, it is more difficult for 
the state to renege on its commitments to refugees as a result of 
regime change or shifts in popular sentiment.22 Teresa Gil-Bazo 
                                                                                                                                  
18. Id. 
19. See, e.g., GOODWIN-GILL & MCADAM, supra note 14, at 9. 
20. See, e.g., Gervase Coles, Approaching the Refugee Problem Today, in REFUGEES 
AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 373, 408 (Gil Loescher & Laila Monahan eds., 1989); 
James C. Hathaway & R. Alexander Neve, Making International Refugee Law Relevant 
Again: A Proposal for Collectivized and Solution-Oriented Protection, 10 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 
115 (1997). 
21. See infra p. 386. 
22. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1249. The authors, who have compiled a 
comprehensive database of the countries that have constitutionalized the right to asylum, note 
that over time there have been two distinct versions of the right to asylum in national 
constitutions: (1) a broad human right and (2) a more narrowly tailored ideological statement, 
which resulted in conditioning asylum on a shared ideology with the host state. Id. at 1260. 
Through quantitative analysis, the authors concluded that the adoption of a constitutional right 
to asylum is positively associated with several factors, including democracy, population (states 
with larger populations are more likely to adopt a constitutional right to asylum), legal system 
(common law countries are less likely to constitutionalize the right to asylum than countries 
with a socialist legal tradition), and the age of the state’s population (a state with a more 
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argues that the right to asylum enshrined in national constitutions is 
broader than refugee status under the Refugee Convention and other 
international instruments, thus affording broader protection to those 
fleeing persecution and other forms of harm in their origin states.23 
However, constitutional asylum is not without limits. For 
example, Kowalczyk and Versteeg point out that constitutions can be 
amended and judges can defer to executive will.24 Lambert, 
Messineo, and Tiedemann argue that because countries such as 
France, Germany and Italy have chosen to adjudicate asylum claims 
almost exclusively according to the Refugee Convention, 
constitutional asylum in those countries has become virtually 
meaningless.25 Moreover, in many cases, states include an “escape 
clause” in their constitutionalized right to asylum, allowing the right 
to be interpreted according to national law.26 Moreover, in some 
situations constitutional asylum is based on the same limited criteria 
as the Refugee Convention.27 
Although the recent scholarship on the constitutionalized right to 
asylum is important for illuminating the motivations behind the 
creation of the right of asylum and for positioning it as a fundamental 
                                                                                                                                  
elderly population dependent on a younger work force is more likely to constitutionalize the 
right to asylum). Perhaps most significant for purposes of this article, Kowalczyk and Versteeg 
note that ratification of the Refugee Convention is negatively associated with 
constitutionalizing the right to asylum, suggesting that many countries view constitutional 
protections as a substitute, rather than a compliment, to international protections for refugees. 
Id. at 1284-85. 
23. See Gil-Bazo, supra note 10, at 4 (“the conceptual distinction [between asylum and 
refugee status under the Refugee Convention] remains soundly established in law and 
practice”). 
24. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1249-50.  
25. See Hélène Lambert et al., Comparative Perspectives of Constitutional Asylum in 
France, Italy, and Germany: Requiescat in Pace?, 27 REFUGEE SURV. Q., no. 3, 2008, at 16, 
17.  
26. My thanks to my University of Minnesota colleague Chris Roberts for this term. For 
example, the Portuguese Constitution states, in relevant part, “The status of political refugees 
shall be defined by law.” CONSTITUTION OF THE PORTUGUESE REPUBLIC Apr. 25, 1974, art. 
33(7). Similarly, the Polish Constitution states, in relevant part, “Foreigners shall have a right 
of asylum in the Republic of Poland in accordance with principles specified by statute.” THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF POLAND Apr. 2, 1997, art. 56(1). 
27. For example, the Constitution of Hungary states, in relevant part, “Hungary shall 
grant asylum to all non-Hungarian citizens as requested if they are being persecuted or have a 
well-founded fear of persecution in their native countries or in the countries of their usual 
residence due to their racial or national identities, affiliation to a particular social group, or to 
their religious or political persuasions, unless they receive protection from their countries of 
origin or any other country.” MAGYARORSÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF 
HUNGARY], ALAPTÖRVÉNY. 
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principle of international law, it does not address whether the 
constitutionalized right to asylum makes any difference to refugees 
seeking protection from persecution.28 That is, we have no idea 
whether a constitutional right to asylum in a particular country of 
refuge makes it any more or less likely that a given asylum seeker 
will be granted asylum. Similarly, we do not know whether a 
constitutionalized right to asylum makes a particular country’s asylum 
adjudication system more or less favorably disposed toward asylum 
seekers. 
These are the questions that this article begins to address. That 
is, under what circumstances is a constitutionalized right to asylum 
likely to help asylum seekers obtain protection. In so doing, this 
article contributes to three areas of scholarship. The first, most 
obviously, is the burgeoning literature on the constitutional right to 
asylum, which is a subset of the literature on the expansion of the 
constitutionalization of human rights law more generally.29 Secondly, 
because the success of a constitutionalized right to asylum law 
depends in large part on the lawyers who utilize it, this article will 
contribute to scholarship on cause lawyering.30 Third, the article will 
contribute to the literature on the effectiveness of human rights 
treaties, given that the constitutionalization of human rights law has 
been recognized as one of the factors positively associated with 
improved state behavior.31 
                                                                                                                                  
28. Kowalczyk and Versteeg acknowledge this explicitly. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra 
note 10, at 1284 (“Although we do not provide an answer to the question whether the right to 
asylum is effective, the apparently self-serving motivations for including asylum rights are not 
necessarily detrimental for asylum-seekers nor do they necessarily undermine the right”). 
29. For a review of recent literature on the constitutionalization of human rights law, see 
Guilherme Leite Gonçalves & Sérgio Costa, The Global Constitutionalization of Human 
Rights: Overcoming Contemporary Injustices or Juridifying Old Asymmetries?, CURRENT 
SOC., Mar. 2016, at 311. 
30. The cause lawyering literature has been criticized as being under-theorized, focusing 
more on descriptive narratives of various cause lawyers, rather than on any overarching 
analysis of cause lawyering. See Anna-Maria Marshall & Daniel Crocker Hale, Cause 
Lawyering, 10 AN. REV. L. & SOC. SCI., Nov. 2014, at 301; see also Christos Boukalas Politics 
as Legal Action/ Lawyers as Political Actors: Towards a Reconceptualisation of Cause 
Lawyering, 22 SOC. & LEGAL STUD., Sept. 2013, at 395; see also Jayanth K. Krishnan, 
Lawyering for a Cause and Experiences from Abroad, 94 CAL. L. REV. 575, 579 (2005). 
31. Several scholars have identified constitutionalization of human rights law as a 
mechanism that heightens the effectiveness of human rights treaties. See, e.g., Zachary Elkins 
et al., Getting to Rights: Treaty Ratification, Constitutional Convergence, and Human Rights 
Practice, 54 HARV. INT’L L.J. 61, 64-65 (2013) (“we find that . . . international [human rights] 
instruments have a powerful coordinating effect on the contents of national constitutions … 
This finding also suggests that international law is most effective when it works with domestic 
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III. THE GROWTH IN THE CONSTITUTIONALIZED RIGHT TO 
ASYLUM  
The expanding right to asylum in national constitutions around 
the world is a part of the exponential growth in constitutionalized 
human rights law in general over the past seventy years.32 In 1950, 
only eleven percent of constitutions contained a right to asylum.33 In 
most cases, the right was created in the immediate aftermath of World 
War II and was thus influenced by two geopolitical factors: in cases 
such as France and Italy, the right to asylum was included in the state 
constitution as a token of gratitude toward those states that had 
accepted French and Italian refugees before and during World War 
II;34 and in Soviet Bloc countries such as Poland, the right to asylum 
was conditioned on shared ideologies.35 
By 2017, the percentage of countries with constitutions 
containing a right to asylum had risen to thirty-five percent, with the 
                                                                                                                                  
institutions, including constitutional structure.”); see also Wayne Sandholtz, Treaties, 
Constitutions and Courts: The Critical Combination, in THE POLITICS OF THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF LAW: GETTING FROM RIGHTS TO JUSTICE 37-38 (Alison Brysk ed., 2013) 
(finding that “the constitutional status of treaty law and the independence of courts influence 
the level of human rights protections” within a given country); Linda Camp Keith, 
Constitutional Provisions for Individual Human Rights (1976-1996): Are They More than 
Mere ‘Window Dressing?, Mar. 2002, 55 POL. RES. Q., at 111 (finding a statistically 
significant relationship between positive human rights outcomes and the constitutional rights 
to a public trial and to a fair trial). For a general summary of the literature on the effectiveness 
of human rights treaties, see generally Kevin L. Cope & Cosette D. Creamer, Disaggregating 
the Human Rights Treaty Regime, 56 VA. J. INT’L L. 459 (2016), Alison Brysk & Arturo 
Jimenez-Bacardi, The Politics of the Globalization of Law, in THE POLITICS OF THE 
GLOBALIZATION OF LAW, supra note 31, at 1, Emilie M. Hafner-Burton & James Ron, Seeing 
Double: Human Rights Impact through Qualitative and Quantitative Eyes, 61 WORLD POL. 
360 (2009), RYAN GOODMAN AND DEREK JINKS, SOCIALIZING STATES: PROMOTING HUMAN 
RIGHTS THROUGH INTERNATIONAL LAW (2013); Pammela Quinn Saunders, The Integrated 
Enforcement of Human Rights, 45 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 97 (2012); Oona Hathaway, The 
Promise and Limits of the International Law of Torture, in TORTURE: A COLLECTION 199, 234 
(Sanford Levinson ed., 2004). 
32. The number of rights in national constitutions and the number of countries with such 
rights in their constitutions have steadily increased since the mid-20th century. See Elkins et 
al., supra note 31, at 63. As Sandholtz notes, “by the 21st century, constitutional protection of 
human rights had become the global standard.” Sandholtz, supra note 31, at 31. 
33. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1260-61. 
34. See Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 17-18, 21-22. 
35. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1311. One example of such an 
ideologically-framed constitutional right to asylum is contained in the 1952 version of the 
Polish Constitution: “The Polish People’s Republic grants asylum to citizens of foreign 
countries persecuted for defending the interests of the working people, for fighting for social 
progress, for activity in defence of peace, for fighting for national liberation or for scientific 
activity.” CONSTITUTION OF THE POLISH PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC, July 22, 1952, art. 75. 
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greatest increase occurring during the 1990s.36 As Kowalczyk and 
Versteeg note, most of these constitutional provisions, as well as the 
provisions initially included in domestic constitutions after World 
War II, frame asylum as a human right available to all displaced 
people rather than as a limited right available only to those persons 
who can demonstrate a well-founded fear of persecution on account 
of one or more of the five grounds enumerated in the Refugee 
Convention.37 Thus, under most versions of a constitutionalized right 
to asylum, the right is available to non-citizens who have been denied 
their human rights in their host countries. In this way, the 
constitutionalized right to asylum mirrors what has come to be known 
as the human rights approach to asylum law, which links asylum to 
the denial of human rights protections in one’s home country or 
territory, rather than limiting it to persecution for one of the five 
grounds enumerated in the Refugee Convention.38 As such, the 
constitutionalized right to asylum provides an especially potent form 
of protection for refugees. As noted above, such domestic 
constitutional protection may be particularly important in an era of 
populist nationalism that is accompanied by hostility toward 
globalized norms and standards. 
IV. CONSTITUTIONALIZED ASYLUM’S POTENTIAL REALIZED: 
PROTECTION FOR COLOMBIAN REFUGEES IN ECUADOR 
The potential for strategically utilized constitutional asylum was 
realized in recent litigation challenging Presidential Decree No. 1182 
(“Decree 1182”)39, which limited the rights of asylum seekers in 
Ecuador, most of whom had crossed the border from neighboring 
                                                                                                                                  
36. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 1219. 
37. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2). Kowalczyk and Versteeg also 
note the trend since the Cold War era away from limiting the right to asylum to persons whose 
ideologies were consistent with the host country. Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 
1256. 
38. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 14, at 194; see also Deborah Anker, Refugee 
Law, Gender, and the Human Rights Paradigm, 15 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 133, 143 (2002) 
(finding that the human rights approach assists both the refugee law and human rights law 
regimes). The human rights approach manifests itself most prominently through domestic 
court interpretation of undefined terms in the Refugee Convention, such as “being persecuted.” 
To proponents of this approach, it is appropriate and logical to rely on human rights treaties 
because these treaties reflect a global consensus about the scope of persecutory harms. See 
Hathaway & Foster, supra note 14, at 194. 
39. Decreto Presidencial No. 1182 (June 19, 2012), Registro Oficial 727 (Ecuador).  
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Colombia to escape the decades-long armed conflict in that country.40 
Decree 1182, issued in 2012 by then-President Rafael Correa, 
drastically reduced the amount of time to apply for asylum and to 
appeal an initial decision denying an asylum application.41 It also 
effectively rescinded Ecuador’s adherence to the Cartagena 
Declaration of 1984, which had broadened the protective scope of 
asylum to include those fleeing armed conflict such as the one in 
Colombia.42 A coalition of lawyers and NGOs brought a lawsuit 
against Decree 1182 before the Constitutional Court of Ecuador.43 
They invoked Ecuador’s 2008 Constitution, which was the first 
version of the Ecuadoran Constitution to include an explicit right to 
asylum,44 as well as a prohibition against discriminating against 
persons on the basis of several protected classifications including 
nationality and migratory status.45 In addition to their legal 
                                                                                                                                  
40. See Meili, supra note 5 at 349. 
41. Id. at 349. 
42. Id. The restrictions of Presidential Decree No. 1182 (“Decree 1182”) on the rights of 
asylum seekers had their intended effect: both the number of asylum applications and the 
asylum grant rate declined dramatically following its announcement. Id. at 371. 
43. The cohort of legal organizations that challenged Decree 1182 included those 
operating both domestically and transnationally such as Asylum Access Ecuador and the Law 
Clinic at the Universidad de San Francisco, both based in Quito,  as well as Human Rights 
Watch and the Human Rights and Atrocity Prevention Clinic at the Benjamin N. Cardozo 
School of Law in New York. 
44. Article 41 of the Ecuadoran Constitution states “[The] rights to asylum and sanctuary 
are recognized, in accordance with the law and international human rights instruments.” 
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 41. It is noteworthy that 
this provision guarantees the right to asylum and not merely the right to seek asylum, which is 
contained in human rights instruments such as the UDHR and the American Convention on 
Human Rights (“ACHR”). See G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, supra note 10, art. 14; Organization of 
American States, American Convention on Human Rights art. 22(7), Nov. 22, 1969, 
O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123. The inclusiveness of this provision in the Ecuadoran 
Constitution incorporates instruments such as the Cartagena Declaration, which, broadens the 
scope of the right to asylum to include persons fleeing generalized violence. Ecuador is only 
one of many Latin American countries that recognize the right to asylum in its constitution. 
See Maria-Teresa Gil-Bazo, Asylum in the Practice of Latin American and African States 
(UNHCR Research Paper Series, No. 249, 2013). 
45. Article 11(2) of the Ecuadoran Constitution states:  
 All persons are equal and shall enjoy the same rights, duties and opportunities. No 
one shall be discriminated against for reasons of ethnic belonging, place of birth, 
age, sex, gender identity, cultural identity, civil status, language, religion, ideology, 
political affiliation, legal record, socio-economic condition, migratory status, sexual 
orientation, health status, HIV carrier, disability, physical difference or any other 
distinguishing feature, whether personal or collective, temporary or permanent, 
which might be aimed at or result in the diminishment or annulment of recognition, 
enjoyment or exercise of rights. All forms of discrimination are punishable by law. 
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arguments, the lawyers made reference to Ecuador’s reputation as 
sympathetic to refugees in their public relations campaign associated 
with the litigation.46 
In August 2014, the Ecuadoran Constitutional Court issued a 
decision striking down Decree 1182’s limitations on the right to 
asylum.47 The decision reinstated the previous deadlines for filing 
asylum applications and appeals on the grounds that the shorter time 
limits imposed by Decree 1182 discriminated against asylum seekers 
when compared to other persons applying for various benefits under 
Ecuadoran law.48 And the Court reinstated the Cartagena 
Declaration’s broad definition of a refugee on the grounds that (1) the 
Declaration had been incorporated into Ecuador’s Constitution and 
(2) restricting asylum to the five grounds enumerated in the Refugee 
Convention violates the principle of non-refoulement, a principle 
specifically enshrined in the Ecuadoran Constitution.49 
From a human rights perspective, the Constitutional Court’s 
decision was noteworthy for three reasons. First, it demonstrated the 
Court’s willingness to reject the executive’s attempt to restrict the 
human rights of asylum seekers. In a country with a history of a non-
independent judiciary, this is no small feat.50 Second, the decision 
                                                                                                                                  
The State shall adopt affirmative action measures that promote real equality for the 
benefit of the rights-bearers who are in a situation of inequality.  
CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF ECUADOR, Oct. 20, 2008, art. 11(2) (emphases 
added). 
46. See Richard E. Bilsborrow, The Living Conditions of Refugees, Asylum Seekers and 
Other Colombians in Ecuador: Millennium Development Indicators and Coping Behaviour, 5 
(Oct. 2006), http://www.unhcr.org/45adf2d82.pdf [https://perma.cc/JJ2M-AF7C] (archived 
Dec. 21, 2017); see also Ian McGrath, New Issues in Refugee Research: Enhanced Refugee 
Registration and Human Security in Northern Ecuador 3 (UNHCR Research Paper Series, No. 
198, 2011), http://www.unhcr.org/4d35556e9.html (“Despite its security and development 
challenges, Ecuador is often viewed as a model of refugee integration because of its open 
borders, generous rights entitlements and lack of encampment policies.”). See Meili, supra 
note 5, at 374-75.  
47. Sentencia N. 002-14-Sin-CC, Case No.: 0056-12-IN y 0003-12-IA, August 14, 2014. 
[hereinafter “Const. Court decision”]. 
48. Id. See also, Meili, supra note 5, at 378. 
49. See Meili, supra note 5, at 376-79. The Constitutional Court’s decision was not, 
however, an unvarnished victory for the lawyers who filed the case. The Court rejected their 
argument that Decree 1182 was an unconstitutional exercise of executive power. Id. As a 
result, the President retains the ability to rule on important matters of constitutional law by 
executive fiat, rather than through the legislative process. 
50. In studies conducted in 2016 by the World Justice Project, Ecuador ranked 91st out 
of 113 countries in the world and 25th out of thirty in Latin America and the Caribbean in 
adherence to the rule of law and scored below average on most measures of judicial 
independence, including corruption within the judiciary and effective judicial limits on 
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invoked international human rights law and instruments that had been 
made part of the 2008 Constitution. In this way, the Ecuadoran 
Constitution, and the human rights law it incorporates, was a 
mechanism for the mobilization of civil society to achieve positive 
rights outcomes. That mobilization is likely to have a lasting impact, 
as it improved the reputations and strengthened the credibility of the 
refugee advocates in the eyes of the government.51 Third, the decision 
– as well as the litigation leading to it – suggested several factors that 
appear to have influenced the degree to which cause lawyers and 
NGOs were able to utilize constitutionalized human rights law to 
achieve their objectives. These factors include the following: (1) the 
presence of domestic cause lawyers who challenge state practices on 
the grounds that they violate constitutionalized human rights norms; 
(2) the presence of transnational cause lawyers who challenge state 
practices by referencing international human rights law that has been 
incorporated into the domestic constitution, either through reference 
to international instruments or to provisions derived from such 
instruments; (3) the country’s global reputation for protecting human 
rights, which allows principled agents to engage in shaming tactics; 
and (4) the extent to which the rights-based challenge advanced by 
the cause lawyers threatens key state actors.52 In the next section of 
this article, this article will analyze whether these factors are 
generalizable to other countries that are experiencing an increase in 
refugee migration. 
In sum, the successful utilization of the constitutionalized right 
to asylum in Ecuador is a concrete example of the impact such a right 
can have on state actors. Were it not for that constitutional provision, 
and more importantly, the use of that right in strategic litigation by 
lawyers operating both domestically and transnationally, the right to 
asylum in Ecuador could continue to be severely limited. It remains to 
be seen whether the Ecuador case is generalizable to other regions 
currently experiencing large refugee flows. That is, can the utilization 
of the constitutionalized right to asylum by lawyers and other 
                                                                                                                                  
government power. Rule of Law Index: 2016, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, at 21, 23, 
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLI_Final-Digital_0.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/FQA9-YH3M] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). In the latter category, it ranked 
103rd out of 113. Id. at 29; accord Santiago Basabe-Serrano, Determinants of the Quality of 
Justice in Latin America: Comparative Analysis of the Ecuadorian Case from a Sub-National 
Perspective, 35 JUST. SYS. J., no. 1, 2014, at 104, 108 . 
51. See Meili, supra note 5, at 378. 
52. Id. at 384-85. 
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advocates impact the behavior of state actors on a larger geographic 
scale? An obvious case for investigation of this question is the current 
refugee situation in Europe. Thus, we now turn to the question of 
whether constitutional asylum could provide a means of expanding 
refugee protection to those from Syria and elsewhere seeking refuge 
in Europe. 
V. THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO ASYLUM IN EUROPE 
As Hélène Lambert observed, “Europe has the most advanced 
regional [refugee] protection regime in the world.”53 Indeed, asylum 
law in Europe operates as a regional project, most notably through the 
development of the Common European Asylum System (“CEAS”), 
which was designed to homogenize the procedures and substance of 
asylum law across EU Member States.54 Moreover, EU Member 
States are bound by the European Convention on Human Rights, 
which provides protection to refugees beyond that afforded under the 
Refugee Convention.55 The rights afforded by these international 
instruments are contested mainly at the regional level through the 
European Court of Human Rights and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union, which have created a significant body of precedent. 
Several NGOs in Europe advocate for the rights of refugees at both 
the regional and national levels.56 Indeed, one could argue there exists 
a separate refugee protection regime for Europe alone. 
As a result of this regional emphasis, some commentators have 
noted that constitutional asylum at the national level in Europe is 
                                                                                                                                  
53. Hélène Lambert, Introduction: European Refugee Law and Transnational 
Emulation, in THE GLOBAL REACH OF EUROPEAN REFUGEE LAW 1 (Jane McAdam ed., 2013). 
54. See Fullerton, supra note 2, at 64-73. 
55. For example, article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) 
protects the right to family life, which many lawyers have argued prohibits EU Member States 
from deporting non-citizens who have established a family life in that Member State, even if 
they do not meet the Refugee Convention’s definition of a “refugee.”  Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Sept. 3, 1953, art. 8, 213 U.N.T.S. 
222; see also Meili, supra note 16. 
56. Ninety-eight NGOs operating in forty countries comprise the European Council on 
Refugees and Exiles (“ECRE”), a pan-European alliance formed to protect and advance the 
rights of refugees, asylum seekers and displaced persons. Mission Statement, ECRE, 
https://www.ecre.org/mission-statement/ [https://perma.cc/2PHC-RTU6] (last visited Dec. 21, 
2017). According to its mission statement, ECRE’s purpose is “to promote the establishment 
of fair and humane European asylum policies and practices in accordance with international 
human rights law.” Id. 
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moribund.57 However, Gil-Bazo argues that the increased availability 
of the right to asylum under constitutions around the world suggests 
that asylum constitutes a general principle of international law that is 
legally binding when interpreting the nature and scope of states’ 
obligations towards individuals seeking protection.58 Moreover, 
asylum is broader than refugee status and, as the Court of Justice of 
the European Union has noted, “Member States may grant a right of 
asylum under their national law to a person who is excluded from 
refugee status.”59 
In addition, the European regional asylum model has come under 
increasing criticism for its failure to adequately protect refugees in the 
so-called “refugee crisis” that began when large numbers of Syrians 
started arriving in various EU Member States in 2015.60 Some of the 
criticisms lodged at the CEAS include (1) that it encourages a “race to 
the bottom” by destination countries who do not wish to be seen as 
having more generous asylum standards,61 (2) that it has failed to 
agree on a responsibility-sharing arrangement among EU Member 
States, leaving states of first entry, such as Italy and Greece, with a 
disproportionate share of the burden of asylum seekers,62 and (3) that 
it has resulted in Member States adopting policies intended to make 
their countries less attractive to asylum-seekers.63 Thus, it is worth 
exploring whether the regional model for refugee protection in the 
European Union might be buttressed and improved by greater 
emphasis on constitutional asylum law at the national level. Such an 
                                                                                                                                  
57. See Lambert et al., supra note 25 (arguing that although the French, Italian, and 
German constitutions contain a right to asylum, international obligations such as the Refugee 
Convention and commitments under EU law have rendered such constitutional provisions 
redundant and virtually obsolete). 
58. See Gil-Bazo, supra note 10, at 5 (citing Joined Cases C 57/09 and C 101/09 
Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B & D [2010] EC I-10979). In the European context in 
particular, Gil-Bazo argues that asylum is an enforceable right given its inclusion in the EU 
Charter of Fundamental Rights. See María-Teresa Gil-Bazo, The Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union and the Right to be Granted Asylum in the Union’s Law, 
REFUGEE STUD. Q., Jan. 2008, at 33. 
59. Joined Cases C 57/09 and C 101/09 Bundesrepublik Deutschland v B & D [2010] EC 
I-10979 ¶ 121; see also Gil-Bazo, supra note 10, at 2.  
60. See generally NATASHA ZAUN, EU ASYLUM POLICIES (2017) 
61. See Elspeth Guild, Does the EU Need a European Migration and Protection Agency? 
28 INT’L J. REF. L.  585, 600 (2016); see also Júlia Mink, EU Asylum Law and Human Rights 
Protection: Revisiting the Principle of Non-Refoulement and the Prohibition of Torture and 
Other Forms of Ill-Treatment, 14 EUR. J. MIGRATION & L. (2012), at 119, 121-24, 148-49; 
ANNA MRATSCHKOWSKI, ASYLUM RELATED ORGANISATIONS IN EUROPE 268-69 (2017). 
62. ZAUN, supra note 60, at 254. 
63. Id. at 256. 
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emphasis might provide a work-around the limitations of the Refugee 
Convention while still providing  the durable solution of asylum law 
(i.e., a pathway to citizenship). 
A. The Right to Asylum in European Constitutions 
The constitutions of slightly less than half of the EU Member 
States contain the right to asylum, though it is articulated slightly 
differently in each constitution.64 For example, in establishing the 
right to asylum, the Hungarian Constitution mirrors the Refugee 
Convention’s definition of refugee.65 The constitutions of the Czech 
Republic, Germany, and the Slovak Republic are more limited than 
the Refugee Convention, providing asylum only to those who were 
persecuted for their political opinions.66 On the other hand, the 
constitutions of several other countries, most notably France and 
Italy, take a broader view, couching the right to asylum in terms of 
the violation of fundamental rights and freedoms.67 Moreover, Italy 
does not require a showing of individualized persecution as a 
prerequisite for asylum, rather, it is presumably enough that the 
applicant has experienced some kind of serious harm in their native 
state.68 This would seem to open the door to asylum for those fleeing 
armed conflict, generalized violence, and the ravages of climate 
change. 
One of the most prominent and significant features of the 
constitutionalized right to asylum in Europe is the way that most 
states link its implementation to the state’s domestic law. For 
example, the Italian Constitution states that qualifying “foreigners” 
have a “right to asylum in [Italy] in accordance with the provisions of 
                                                                                                                                  
64. The EU Member States with constitutions containing a right to asylum are Bulgaria, 
Czech Republic, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Poland, Portugal, the Russia Federation, 
Romania, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Spain. See Kowalczyk & Versteeg, supra note 10, at 
App. A. Although the Greek Constitution does not contain a right to asylum per se, it does 
prohibit the extradition of freedom fighters. See 2001 SYNTAGMA [SYN.][CONSTITUTION] 5 
(Greece). 
65. See MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], 
ALAPTÖRVÉNYE.  
66. See Ústavní zákon č. 43/1993 Sb., Ústava Česke Republiky [Constitution of the 
Czech Republic]; GRUNDGESETZ [GG] [BASIC GERMAN LAW], art. 16a, translation at 
http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_gg/index.html [https://perma.cc/NC7F-NTUT] 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2017); CONSTITUTION OF THE SLOVAK REPUBLIC Oct. 1, 1992, art. 53. 
67. See 1958 CONST. art. 53-1 (Fr.); Art. 10 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). The texts of these 
constitutional provisions are discussed in more detail later in this article. 
68. See Art. 10 Costituzione [Cost.] (It.). 
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law.” Similarly, the Bulgarian Constitution states that “the conditions 
and procedures for granting asylum are established by law.”69 These 
“escape clauses”70 are significant because they enable countries to 
scale back what might otherwise be a broad conception of asylum 
under international norms to a narrower form of relief in accordance 
with domestic law. In those countries which have incorporated the 
Refugee Convention into their domestic law, this could mean limiting 
constitutional asylum to those who meet the Refugee Convention’s 
definition of a refugee, meaning those who can show individual 
persecution on account of one or more of the five enumerated 
grounds. It also means that the grounds for asylum can change much 
more rapidly, such as through the legislative process, than through the 
more complicated and difficult constitutional amendment process. 
And finally, as in the case of Italy, failure of the legislature to enact 
implementing legislation can leave the constitutional right to asylum 
moribund.71 In short, these escape clauses render constitutional 
asylum, at best, no more powerful than other national law, and, at 
worst, virtually meaningless. 
Figure 1 summarizes the key features of the asylum provisions in 
the Constitutions of EU Member States. It indicates the grounds for 
asylum, meaning whether they are more limited than, equivalent to, or 
broader than the Refugee Convention, whether it is necessary to 
demonstrate persecution in order to receive asylum, and whether the 




                                                                                                                                  
69. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF BULGARIA July 12, 1991, art. 27. 
70. See supra note 26. 
71. See Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 24-25 (noting that the lack of domestic 
legislation implementing the right to asylum in the Italian Constitution has resulted in it being 
applied “very marginally” in comparison to refugee status determination pursuant to the 
Refugee Convention, which was incorporated into Italian domestic law through implementing 
legislation passed in 1990). 
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Figure 1: Comparison of Key Features of Constitutional Asylum 
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Figure 1 paints a rather bleak picture of the potential for 
constitutional asylum to make a difference for refugees who manage 
to get to the European Union. Except for Italy, all of the constitutions 
require an asylum seeker to demonstrate that she or he was 
individually persecuted, which apparently rules out broader, human 
rights based claims for relief. Moreover, nearly all of those 
constitutions, with the exception of those in the Czech Republic, 
France, and Hungary, contain an “escape clause” tying the 
determination of asylum to domestic law and requiring some form of 
implementing legislation to enforce it. Of those three countries, only 
France contains a broad, human rights based conception of asylum 
status; it grants asylum to “any foreigner who is persecuted for his 
action in pursuit of freedom or who seeks the protection of France on 
other grounds.”73 Hungary limits asylum to those who are persecuted 
on the same five grounds enumerated in the Refugee Convention.74 
The Czech Constitution allows for a grant of asylum “to aliens who 
are being persecuted for the assertion of their political rights and 
freedoms.”75 While the assertion of political rights and freedoms may 
be somewhat broader than the expression of a political opinion (one 
of the five Refugee Convention grounds), it is nevertheless limited to 
political, rather than economic or social rights and freedoms. Notably, 
                                                                                                                                  
72. Section 13(4) of the Spanish Constitution recognizes the right to asylum but says 
nothing as to its scope. See CONSTITUCIÓN ESPAÑOLA, B.O.E. n. 13(4), Dec. 29,1978. 
However, domestic legislation restricted constitutional asylum to those who meet Refugee 
Convention’s definition of a refugee. See Implementing Decree of Law 5/1984 (March 26) 
regulating Refugee Status and the Right to Asylum, amended by Law 9/1994 (May 16), 
Section 1, Article 5(1)  Law 9/1994 of 19  May 1994; see also Constitution of Spain Section 
13(4). 
73. See 1958 CONST. art. 53-1 (Fr.). 
74. See MAGYARORSZÁG ALAPTÖRVÉNYE [THE FUNDAMENTAL LAW OF HUNGARY], 
ALAPTÖRVÉNYE. 
75. See Ústavní zákon č. 43/1993 Sb., Ústava Česke Republiky [Constitution of the 
Czech Republic]. 
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the French Constitution contains no such limitation on the basis for 
seeking asylum. 
Thus, with the possible exception of France, these limitations 
suggest that constitutional asylum has had a negligible impact on the 
treatment of refugees in those European states where it exists. 
Although a quantitative analysis of the statistical significance of 
constitutional asylum is beyond the scope of this article, data relevant 
to the asylum grant rates in EU Member States offers at least some 
insight into this question. Figure 2 compares the asylum grant rates 
over the past decade in EU Member States with and without a 
constitutionalized right to asylum.76 It includes the number of asylum 
applications considered by each country during that period, the 
number of favorable decisions by the tribunal of first instance, and the 
percentage of the applications that were granted.77 
 














                                                                                                                                  
76. The data in Figure 2 reflect the first instance grant rates for three types of relief 
typically sought by asylum seekers: (1) asylum under the Refugee Convention; (2) subsidiary, 
or complementary, protection; and (3) humanitarian asylum, which is occasionally granted in 
some countries for applicants unable to meet the requirements of the first two categories, but 
who present compelling cases for protection nonetheless, usually related to the applicant’s 
health or age. 
77. Figure 2 does not include figures from appellate decisions; those figures were not 
available for EU Member States during this period of time. 
78. Asylum Recognition Rates in the EU/EFTA by Country, 2008-2016, MIGRATION 
POLICY INSTITUTE, https://www.migrationpolicy.org/programs/data-hub/charts/asylum-
recognition-rates-euefta-country-2008-2016 [https://perma.cc/7RX7-EJHH] (last visited Dec. 
21, 2017).  
















As Figure 2 shows, the average annual grant rate from 2008 to 
2016 of the EU Member States with constitutions containing a right to 
asylum was 45.3% compared to a grant rate of 43.6% in those 
countries without such a constitutional right.79 Certainly, there are 
other factors contributing to a particular country’s asylum grant rate, 
and there is no attempt here to assert a cause and effect relationship 
between a constitutional right to asylum and a country’s grant rate. 
Nevertheless, these figures suggest that the constitutional right to 
asylum is not having a demonstrable impact on asylum seekers’ 
ability to obtain asylum  in those countries where it exists. 
This conclusion is buttressed by anecdotal references to specific 
national policies and grant rates. For example, the country with 
perhaps the most restrictive response to the Syrian refugee crisis is 
Hungary, which closed its border with Serbia in 2015 and whose 
policies have been the subject of challenges to the European Court of 
Human Rights.80 Hungary, as noted above, has a constitutional right 
to asylum, but its grant rate over the past decade was 13.9%, among 
the lowest in the European Union during that period. Similarly, 
                                                                                                                                  
79. The annual figures for each country between 2008 and 2016 are included in 
Appendices A and B. 
80. See European Court of Human Rights on Hungary’s Refugee Policy, HUNGARIAN 
SPECTRUM, (Mar. 15, 2017), http://hungarianspectrum.org/2017/03/15/european-court-of-
human-rights-on-hungarys-refugee-policy/ [https://perma.cc/6JQX-UEKU] (archived Dec. 21, 
2017).  
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France, which decided the second highest number of asylum 
applications during this period and has a constitutional right to 
asylum, granted only 20.6% of applications filed. On the other hand, 
Sweden, which is generally regarded as welcoming towards refugees 
from Syria and elsewhere over the years, has no constitutional right to 
asylum.81 Its grant rate over the past decade was 54.2%, one of the 
highest in the European Union, and higher than every country with a 
constitutional right to asylum except for Bulgaria. 
Although Figure 2 cannot be the basis for any conclusions 
regarding the actual impact of a constitutionalized right to asylum, it, 
together with the summary of constitutional provisions in Figure 1, 
reveals the potential for enhanced utilization of the constitutionalized 
right in two particular countries: France and Italy. As Figure 1 
illustrates, the constitutional provisions providing a right to asylum in 
these countries provide an opening for increased protection for 
refugees. Both contain broad grounds for asylum, extending well 
beyond the confines of the Refugee Convention. Moreover, the Italian 
Constitution does not require a showing of individual persecution82, 
and the French Constitution does not contain an escape clause tying 
the administration of asylum decisions to domestic law. Furthermore, 
Figure 2 shows that France and Italy are two of the most frequent 
destinations for asylum seekers in Europe, with far more asylum 
applications acted upon over the past decade (502,000 and 326,000, 
respectively) than any other country in the European Union with the 
exception of Germany, which decided 1.245 million applications 
during that period. Thus, if constitutional asylum were to become a 
more common form of relief sought in these two countries, a larger 
number of asylum seekers could potentially benefit.83 For this reason, 
this article now turns to a more in-depth analysis of the potential for 
increased utilization of constitutional asylum in France and Italy to 
see whether the factors which contributed to the effective use of 
constitutional asylum in Ecuador apply in these two countries. 
                                                                                                                                  
81. While Sweden’s initial response to the influx of Syrians was welcoming, it has 
adopted more restrictive policies in response to public pressures. See Dan Bilefsky, Sweden 
Toughens Rules for Refugees Seeking Asylum, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 2016), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/22/world/europe/sweden-immigrant-restrictions.html. 
82.  See supra Figure 1.  
83.  Such a benefit might be particularly noticeable in France, where the asylum grant 
rate over the past decade (20.6%) was near the bottom of the EU pack.  See supra Figure 2.  
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B. Prospects for Increased Utilization of Constitutional Asylum in 
France and Italy 
1. France 
The right to asylum is prominent in the French Constitution. 
Indeed, the French Constitution of 1946, unique among the other EU 
Member State constitutions, includes the right to asylum in its 
Preamble, which sets forth the key values of the French Republic as it 
emerged from World War II and what it terms the “victory. . . over 
the regimes that had sought to enslave and degrade humanity.” 
[The people of France] . . . further proclaim, as being especially 
necessary to our times, the political, economic and social 
principles enumerated below: 
. . . .  
Any man persecuted in virtue of his actions in favour [sic] of 
liberty may claim the right of asylum upon the territories of the 
Republic.84 
Underscoring its prominence in the Constitution, the right to 
asylum is listed second in the Preamble, immediately after the equal 
rights of women and men. This is not surprising given that France 
played a key role in accepting refugees from Germany both before 
and after World War II.85 The inclusion of a constitutional right to 
asylum in the 1946 French Constitution is also noteworthy because 
that constitution was enacted prior to the Refugee Convention, which 
was the first time the international community as a whole recognized 
the need to address what it termed the “refugee problem” in Europe.86 
Although certainly a bold statement regarding the importance of 
asylum in principle, in practical terms asylum as articulated in the 
Preamble is limited to those who had participated in some form in the 
cause for freedom. As such, it would presumably exclude those who 
had been passive victims of persecution and those who had been 
persecuted for reasons such as race, nationality, religion, or other 
                                                                                                                                  
84. 1946 CONST. pmbl. §§ 1-2, 4. The Preamble to the 1958 French Constitution (the 
most recent in that country) incorporates the principles enumerated in the 1946 Constitution. 
See 1958 CONST. pmbl. 
85.  1946 CONST. pmbl. § 4.  
86. The Preamble to the Refugee Convention expresses “the wish that all States, 
recognizing the social and humanitarian nature of the problem of refugees, will do everything 
within their power to prevent this problem from becoming a cause of tension between States.” 
Refugee Convention, supra note 3, at pmbl. 
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characteristics.87 It would also exclude those fleeing non-
individualized harm, such as armed conflict or climate change. 
Accordingly, one could interpret this statement of asylum as more 
limited than that the five grounds covered in the Refugee Convention. 
What makes the French constitutional right to asylum more 
intriguing as a potential additional source of relief, however, are the 
amendments to 1958 French Constitution, the most recent version. 
Article 53-1 of the 1958 Constitution was the first time the 
constitutional right to asylum appeared in the substantive articles of 
French Constitution. Although that provision mirrors the Preamble in 
terms of requiring persecution for participating in the pursuit of 
freedom, it adds a catch-all phrase that includes anyone “who seeks 
the protection of France on other grounds.”88 This is the broadest 
basis for the constitutional right to asylum in the European Union, 
allowing asylum claims based on a host of grounds, including, 
presumably, armed conflict and climate change, as well as gender, 
domestic violence, sexual preference, and other grounds not explicitly 
covered by the Refugee Convention. 
Although the French courts and legislature have authorized the 
use of the constitutional right to asylum, there has been some debate 
about its scope vis-à-vis the Refugee Convention. In 1993, the French 
Constitutional Court held that the constitutional right to asylum in 
France is a fundamental right of a constitutional state, thus allowing it 
to be enforced by individuals and protected by the constitutional legal 
order.89 This decision transformed constitutionalized asylum in 
France from words on paper to an enforceable right. Then, in 1998, 
France passed the Aliens Act, which deemed administrative 
authorities competent to decide asylum claims under both the Refugee 
Convention and the Constitution.90 This “principle of unity” among 
the different bases for asylum extended to asylum procedure and to 
the legal status awarded to a successful asylum claim, regardless of 
the source of that claim (i.e., the Refugee Convention or the 
Constitution) but not necessarily to the standards for deciding such a 
                                                                                                                                  
87. Many of these bases for persecution would be addressed a few years later in the 
Refugee Convention. See Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I(A)(2).  
88. 1958 CONST. Art. 53-1. 
89. Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 93-325, Aug.12, 
1993. For a more detailed description of this decision, see Lambert et al. supra note 25, at 19, 
n.11. 
90. See Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 19-20.   
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claim.91 As such, it would appear that the French Constitution allows 
asylum seekers to bring asylum claims on other bases than those 
permitted under the Refugee Convention. 
Nevertheless, according to some commentators, the 
constitutional right to asylum has not been taken seriously in France, 
given that French authorities prioritize the Refugee Convention as the 
main source of protection for refugees.92 One recent exception is a 
case in which the Administrative Tribunal in Nantes found that the 
denial of a short-term visa to a Syrian asylum seeker in order to apply 
for asylum in France violated the French Constitution’s right to 
asylum.93 This case suggests that while perhaps on life support, 
constitutional asylum is not completely obsolete in France, and may 
be poised for a revival. For as the next several paragraphs of this 
article indicate, when analyzed according to the factors which were 
conducive to the effective utilization of constitutionalized refugee law 
by cause lawyers in Ecuador, the political and legal context in France 
would seem to support a similar effort in that country. 
As noted above, recent litigation over refugee rights in Ecuador 
revealed that the effective use of constitutionalized human rights law 
(including the right to asylum) in that case depended on several 
factors, including cause lawyers acting both domestically and 
transnationally to navigate the political and legal context within 
which the limitation on rights occurred, the willingness of the 
judiciary to act independently of the executive and legislative 
branches, and the state’s reputation for welcoming refugees. As 
described below, these factors augur well for an increased utilization 
of constitutional asylum in France. 
France scores very high on several rule of law factors, including 
an independent judiciary that is necessary to counteract political 
pressures regarding refugees and asylum-seekers in the current 
climate.94 In the World Justice Project’s Rule of Law Index for 2016, 
                                                                                                                                  
91. See id.  
92. See id. at 21. 
93. M et autres v Republique Française, Case No. 1407765 (Sept. 16, 2014), 3–4. 
94. While the victory of Emmanuel Macron over Marine Le Pen in France’s Presidential 
election in May 2017 brought some hope for a more generous attitude toward refugees, his 
policies have not changed in any significant respect from his predecessors. For example, 
France has yet to meet its quota of accepting additional refugees that grew out of an EU 
agreement in 2015, and it still refuses to allow French vessels that pick up migrants in the 
Mediterranean Sea from docking in French ports. See France’s Macron Tests Italy’s Patience 
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France was ranked twenty-third among 113 countries (thirteenth out 
of twenty-four countries regionally) in the category of civil justice, 
which includes the independence of the judiciary.95 
France has an active civil society on immigration and refugee 
matters. Among the groups that advocate for the rights of refugees 
and asylum seekers are Forum Réfugiés-Cosi, France Terre d’Asile, 
and Pour une Planète sans Frontieres.96 Each of these organizations is 
a member of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles 
(“ECRE”), which describes itself as a pan-European alliance of 
ninety-eight NGOs advancing and protecting the rights of refugees.97 
ECRE supports strategic litigation, and coordinates other legal 
activities, on refugee issues throughout the European Union. In 
addition, France has an experienced and active immigration and 
refugee law bar that has proven adept at strategic utilization of 
procedural tools to advance the interests of their clients.98 
Like many other countries, France’s attitude toward immigrants 
generally, and refugees in particular, is dependent on three primary 
factors: marginality, economic self-interest, and contact.99 France has 
a history of accepting refugees from Germany both before and after 
World War II, though the impact of this legacy on current attitudes is 
not clear. It appears that elites are more favorably disposed toward 
                                                                                                                                  
over Refugees, FIN. TIMES (July 20, 2017), https://www.ft.com/content/2db5a7ba-6c7e-11e7-
bfeb-33fe0c5b7eaa (last visited August 26, 2017). 
95. Rule of Law Index: 2016, France, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/FRA [https://perma.cc/RJP4-2TKL] (last visited 
on Dec. 21, 2017).   
96. For further information on these organizations, see generally FORUM RÉFUGIÉS, 
http://www.forumrefugies.org/ [https://perma.cc/5MSW-H6ZK] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); 
FRANCE TERRE D’ASILE, http://www.france-terre-asile.org/ [https://perma.cc/V6YM-ESBH] 
(last visited Dec. 21, 2017); and POUR UNE PLANETE SANS FRONTIERES, 
http://www.pouruneplanetesansfrontieres.eu/ [https://perma.cc/6YT7-HYVP] (last visited Dec. 
21, 2017). 
97. See Our Work, EUROPEAN COUNCIL ON REFUGEES AND EXILES (“ECRE”),  
https://www.ecre.org/our-work/ [https://perma.cc/CU9N-575X] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
98. See generally LEILA KEWAR, CONTESTING IMMIGRATION POLICY IN COURT: LEGAL 
ACTIVISM AND ITS RADIATING EFFECTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND FRANCE (2015). 
99. See JOEL S. FETZER, PUBLIC ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, FRANCE, AND GERMANY 1-24 (2000). In Fetzer’s analysis, marginality refers to the 
extent to which immigrants are marginalized within society, which tends to affect their 
perception among the native-born population in a negative way. Economic self-interest refers 
to the phenomenon whereby native born citizens are more apprehensive about immigrants 
during periods of economic insecurity. And contact refers to the phenomenon whereby native 
born citizens will have a more favorable view of immigrants if they encounter them more often 
in their daily lives. Id. 
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immigrants than the rank and file population. On the other hand, in 
comparison with some of the other immigrant and refugee-destination 
countries within Europe, the French public is much more receptive 
toward refugees in particular. Figures 3, 4, and 5, based on recent 
survey data from the Pew Research Center, illustrate this 
phenomenon: 



















According to these data, the French public is less likely than 
nearly any other EU Member State surveyed to link refugees with 
terrorism. These figures are particularly striking given that the data 
were collected after the terror attacks at Charlie Hebdo headquarters 
and at the Bataclan Theater in January and November 2015, 
respectively (though before scores of pedestrians were killed by a 
truck in Nice on Bastille Day in 2016). It is also somewhat surprising 
that the public attitude toward refugees in France is more accepting 
than in Sweden, given the latter country’s reputation for tolerance 
toward refugees. 
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Figure 4: Public Opinion of Refugees from Syria and Iraq in the 
















The data revealed in Figure 4 is somewhat less surprising than in 
Figure 3, as there appears to be a correlation between perceptions of 
threat from refugees (at least those from Syria and Iraq) and 
geographic proximity to their countries of origin. Respondents from 
European countries that are either on or near migration routes from 
North Africa and the Middle East (whether via boat or on foot) are 
more fearful of refugees than respondents from countries further 
removed from those routes. Here, the French public is considerably 
more apprehensive about refugees than several other EU Member 
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The subject of the question presented in Figure 5 is broader than 
refugees, which may help to explain why its results depart from 
Figure 4. Nevertheless, it is striking for the relative tolerance of “the 
other” registered in France vis-à-vis other EU Member States (of 
course, given the demographics of the French population, many of the 
respondents were likely diverse themselves). When combined with 
the data from the other two Figures, they suggest that while France 
may not have an enduring reputation for welcoming refugees, and the 
government may have no interest in cultivating such a relationship 
(unlike in Ecuador), it appears that the public would be somewhat 
sympathetic to such efforts. Or, at least more sympathetic than the 
majority of EU Member States. 
In sum, when measured according to the factors which were 
conducive to the successful use of constitutionalized human rights 
provisions in Ecuador, France would seem to be a site for a more 
concerted effort to include constitutionalized asylum in the legal 
toolkit of cause lawyers and other advocates. It has one of the most 
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independent judiciaries in the world.100 It has an active civil society 
devoted to the issue of refugee rights, featuring lawyers who work 
both nationally and transnationally. Although it does not have a 
particularly strong reputation (or record) for protecting refugees that 
might otherwise be used for “naming and shaming” purposes, the 
French public is among the least hostile to refugees within the 
European Union. Significant barriers to the increased utilization of 
constitutional asylum remain, but the potential for such an increase is 
surely present. 
2. Italy 
The asylum provision in the Italian Constitution of 1948 is one 
of the most broadly worded in the European Union, the result of the 
debt of gratitude that the country felt towards those nations who 
received refugees from Italy during World War II.101 It holds that: “A 
foreigner who, in his home country, is denied the actual exercise of 
the democratic freedoms guaranteed by the Italian constitution shall 
be entitled to the right of asylum under the conditions established by 
law.”102 
Thus, anyone who is deprived of rights available to Italian 
citizens can seek asylum in Italy. As Lambert points out, this 
provision, at least in theory, allows for asylum for non-citizens who 
have been denied an array of rights in their home country, including 
habeas corpus, freedom of movement within their home state’s 
borders, freedom to participate in political parties, the right to 
secrecy, voting rights, and labor rights including wages in proportion 
to the quantity and quality of their work, a weekly day of rest, and 
annual paid holidays.103 
Of course, Italy’s constitutional asylum provision also contains 
an escape clause, though the government has never passed 
implementing legislation. On the one hand, this deficit has had the 
advantage of leaving it to the courts to determine the scope of the 
                                                                                                                                  
100. As noted above, the World Justice Project ranked France twenty-third out of 113 
countries on its civil justice scale. Ecuador was ranked ninety-first on the same scale, and 
twenty-fifth out of thirty countries regionally. See Rule of Law Index: 2016, France, supra 
note 95.   
101. See Lambert et al. supra note 25, at 22; Fullerton, supra note 2, at 73. 
102. Italian Constitution, article 10.  
103. Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 23-24 (citing articles 13, 16, 49, 48 and 36 of the 
Italian Constitution). 
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constitutional right. In two key decisions, those courts have affirmed 
that the right to asylum in the Constitution is an individual right 
directly enforceable in civil courts.104 The first of these was a 1997 
decision of the Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (Italy’s highest 
court) holding that the constitutional right to asylum is a binding legal 
norm.105 Following a series of subsequent legislative enactments 
containing a number of exceptions rendering that decision virtually 
meaningless, the Italian Constitutional Court reaffirmed the Court of 
Cassation decision in 2004 and 2006.106 
On the other hand, the lack of implementing legislation has 
resulted in a number of court decisions limiting the scope of 
constitutional asylum, including a decision by the Supreme Court of 
Cassation holding that it only entitles an asylum-seeker to enter Italy 
and remain in the country while their application for refugee status 
under the Refugee Convention is processed.107 The lack of 
implementing legislation has also meant that there are no special 
procedural rules for constitutional asylum claims, leaving applicants 
to the general rules of civil procedure which, in Italy, means among 
other things delays for as long as ten years in civil court.108 In 
contrast, having ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and passed 
implementing legislation pursuant to it, Italy has adopted various EU 
procedural rules governing the processing of asylum applications. As 
a result, the vast majority of asylum applications filed in Italy proceed 
                                                                                                                                  
104. These decisions made it clear that the constitutional right to asylum is more than a 
so-called “legitimate interest” of the person claiming the right, but enjoys the status of a 
“subjective right.” Under Italian law, a “legitimate interest” is legally protected only so far as 
it comports with the public interest or results from the lawful execution of administrative 
power. Administrative courts generally have jurisdiction over legitimate interests, while civil 
courts will hear claims involving subjective rights. See Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 22-23. 
105. Italian Supreme Court of Cassation (Corte Suprema di Cassazione), Allen v. 
Ministry of the Interior, no. 4674/1997 (sez. un. civ.), Rivista di diritto internazionale, Vol. 80, 
1997, 843. This decision followed on several lower court decisions to the same effect. Lambert 
et al., supra note 25, at 22. 
106. Italian Constitutional Court (Corte costituzionale), Constitutional legitimacy of two 
provisions of the act regulating labor law in the public sector, no. 204/2004, Foro It., 2004-I, 
2596; Italian Constitutional Court, Constitutional legitimacy of a provision of the act 
regulating expropriation in the public interest, no. 191/2006, Foro It., 2006-I, 1625. 
107. Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Ministry of the Interior and others v. Aday, n. 
25028/2005 (sez. I civile), Foro It., 2006-I, 2851; Italian Supreme Court of Cassation, Selimi v. 
Italian Ministry of the Interior, no. 18549/2006 (sez. I civile), Foro It., 2007-I, 1869. See also 
Lambert, et al., supra note 25, at 24. 
108. Lambert et al., supra note 25, at 25. 
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through the Refugee Convention.109 As Lambert puts it, constitutional 
asylum is only brought to occasional life by “random enlightened 
judges across the country.”110 
Further clouding the picture for the prospect of more vigorous 
utilization of constitutional asylum in Italy are the set of “Ecuador 
Factors”, which are less favorable in Italy than in France. For 
example, in its Rule of Law Report, the World Justice Project has 
recently ranked the Italian judiciary forty-sixth out of 113 countries 
on its civil justice scale, which includes judicial independence, 
twenty-three places below France.111 It was near the bottom of 
European countries in this category, ranked twenty-second out of 
twenty-four. Moreover, as Figures 3 through 5, above, reveal, the 
Italian public is less accepting of refugees than their counterparts in 
France. More than half of Italian respondents, according to the Pew 
Research Center, believe that (1) refugees increase the likelihood of 
terrorism in their country, (2) refugees from Syria and Iraq are a 
major threat to Italy, and (3) increased diversity has made Italy a 
worse place to live. Less than half of the respondents in France held 
the same views on each of these questions.112 
On the other hand, Italy, like France, has an active civil society 
devoted to the legal rights of refugees and asylum-seekers. Italy-based 
members of the European Council on Refugees and Exiles include the 
Italian Council on Refugees, MOSAICO – Action for Refugees, 
ASGI (Association for Juridical Studies on Immigration), and Oxfam 
Italia Intercultura.113 In addition, Italy, like France, sports an active 
immigration and refugee law bar. 
                                                                                                                                  
109. According to Lambert, the estimated number of recognized constitutional asylum 
claims in the years since the right was created “has not exceeded 200.” Lambert et al., supra 
note 25, at 25. In contrast, nearly 5,000 asylum-seekers were granted refugee status in Italy 
under the Refugee Convention in 2016 alone. See Migration Policy Institute, supra note 78 
(select Italy from Nationality dropdown menu).   
110. Lambert et al. supra note 25, at 25. 
111. Rule of Law Index: 2016, Italy, WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, 
http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#/groups/ITA [https://perma.cc/R78K-4VD4] (last visited 
on Dec. 21, 2017).  
112. See infra Figures 3-5.   
113. For further information on these organizations, see generally CIR RIFUGIATI, 
http://www.cir-onlus.org/en/ [https://perma.cc/836R-PAP4] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); 
MOSAICO REFUGEES, http://www.mosaicorefugees.org/site/?page_id=119&lang=en [https://
perma.cc/N49T-WNQE] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); ASSOCIAZIONE PER GLI STUDI GIURIDICI 
SULL’IMMIGRAZIONE, https://www.asgi.it/chi-siamo/english-version/ [https://perma.cc/EL9V-
EU79] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017); OXFAM ITALIA, https://www.oxfamitalia.org/ 
[https://perma.cc/V2ET-5LHS] (last visited Dec. 21, 2017). 
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VI. PROSPECTS FOR A MORE ROBUST UTILIZATION OF 
CONSTITUTIONAL ASYLUM  
There is little debate as to the inability of current legal 
mechanisms to adequately cope with ongoing refugee crises around 
the world. The chief international instrument designed to protect 
refugees from persecution, the 1951 Refugee Convention, was the 
product of a different time with far fewer factors compelling 
individuals to leave their homeland. While the Refugee Convention 
has proved remarkably flexible in addressing ever-changing forms of 
persecution (primarily because of the elasticity with which courts and 
other adjudicators have interpreted the “particular social group” 
ground for relief) the recent crisis caused by the armed conflict in 
Syria has demonstrated that additional means of legal protection are 
warranted. 
One of those additional forms of protection is the constitutional 
right to asylum. Its presence in constitutions around the world has 
increased markedly in the past few decades. It has several advantages 
over asylum pursuant to the Refugee Convention, the most important 
of which is that it is often couched in broad terms, offering protection 
to individuals for violations of human rights writ large, rather than 
persecution based on one of five specific grounds. But it also has 
certain political advantages, which have come into sharper relief 
given the current geopolitical climate. For example, it is less 
vulnerable to political shifts than statutory asylum, which is typically 
the result of incorporation of the Refugee Convention into domestic 
law. Constitutions are generally more difficult to amend than statutes, 
and thus less susceptible to changes in political opinion and regimes. 
Because they express a nation’s highest moral and ethical ideals, they 
are generally impervious to nationalistic claims of influence from 
international forces. 
Constitutional asylum is also superior to subsidiary or 
complimentary protection. Like asylum under the Refugee 
Convention, it provides a durable solution for refugees, rather than 
temporary protection that can be removed once the condition 
precipitating the applicant’s flight has abated. It can also be 
adjudicated in domestic courts under domestic law, without the need 
to interpret the international human rights treaties upon which 
subsidiary protection is often based. Judges, as well as administrative 
tribunals, are typically far more comfortable interpreting domestic 
law than international or foreign law. 
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Despite these inherent advantages, constitutional asylum has 
remained virtually dormant throughout the world. There are few 
reported cases interpreting it. It is safe to say that, at least up until 
now, it has been yet another example of international human rights 
norms that are agreed upon by states through ratified treaties or 
incorporated into domestic law but serve as window dressing rather 
than the means to actually improve human rights outcomes. They 
allow states to improve their self-image or make a political statement, 
but there is little real action behind the words. 
Thus, while constitutional asylum allows states to proclaim 
support for refugees (or at least certain classes of refugees, depending 
on how the constitutional provision is worded) it has been left to the 
Refugee Convention to put meat on the normative bones. Once 
individual states ratified the Refugee Convention and incorporated it 
into their domestic law, it established a set of legal standards and 
administrative procedures that lawyers could engage with in court and 
administrative tribunals on behalf of their clients. The Refugee 
Convention left constitutional asylum in the dust. 
But the tide may be turning, ever so slowly. The first signs of 
this are evident in Latin America, where the idea of “Transformative 
Constitutionalism” has taken hold, seeing national constitutions as a 
means of diffusing human rights standards throughout a region 
historically plagued by authoritarian regimes.114 Although many 
scholars have expressed frustration at the disconnect between the 
proliferation of human rights provisions in Latin American 
constitutions and the persistence of poverty, injustice, corruption and 
other problems throughout the region, the presence of such provisions 
– including the right to asylum – provides cause lawyers with a 
potentially powerful tool for protecting the rights of refugees. The 
litigation over Decree 1182 in Ecuador is one example of how 
strategically-minded cause lawyers can navigate the political and 
legal context in order to breathe life into otherwise high-minded but 
ineffective constitutional provisions.115 
The European context is obviously different. Human rights 
norms are already diffused throughout the regional asylum system in 
the European Union. Such norms provide the analytical framework 
for subsidiary protection under a variety of human rights treaties. 
                                                                                                                                  
114. See von Bogdandy et al., supra note 5, at 4. 
115. See generally Meili, supra note 5. 
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Moreover, domestic courts in numerous European states have adopted 
the human rights approach to asylum law, under which judge rely on 
human rights treaties (and the jurisprudence that has been developed 
around them) in order to interpret undefined and vague terms in the 
Refugee Convention.116 What role can domestic, constitutional 
asylum law play in such a system? 
Plenty, as it turns out. This article has already articulated the 
advantages that constitutional asylum holds over the Refugee 
Convention. But in order for the potential of a revitalized 
constitutional asylum to take hold in Europe, two changes in mindset 
are necessary. The first is that such a change has less to do with 
human rights or moral authority than it does with the hard reality of 
domestic politics. For it is domestic politics that has brought the 
regional asylum system in Europe, described rather glowingly a 
decade ago by Helene Lambert as the most advanced in the world, to 
its knees.117 Despite numerous attempts by the much-heralded 
Common European Asylum System to harmonize procedures, 
standards and, ultimately, asylum grant rates across EU borders, 
individual states, subject to increasingly hostile attitudes toward 
refugees among their populations, have stubbornly adhered to their 
own decision-making practices. The result, as Figure 2 above 
demonstrates, is a disparity of as much as 68.9% in asylum grant rates 
between EU Member States over the past decade.118 
The second necessary change is by the lawyers who represent 
asylum seekers in Europe. Their overwhelmingly normal practice, 
based on years of experience, is to litigate asylum cases under some 
combination of the Refugee Convention and the human rights treaties 
upon which subsidiary protection is based.119 They have looked to the 
jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights as precedent in 
                                                                                                                                  
116. See Hathaway & Foster, supra note 14, at 196-98 (documenting the many national 
judiciaries in Europe – and elsewhere – that have adopted the human rights approach to 
asylum law). 
117. See Lambert, supra note 25 at 1.  
118. Bulgaria’s grant rate between 2008 and 2016 was 77.5%. Greece’s was 8.6%. See 
infra Figure 2.  
119. As I have noted elsewhere, judges are far more skeptical of subsidiary protection 
claims than those brought pursuant to the Refugee Convention. According to lawyers 
representing refugees in Canada and the United Kingdom, judges often think that lawyers who 
assert subsidiary claims are overcompensating for weak claims under the Refugee Convention, 
and are inclined to deny relief as a result. See Meili, supra note 16; see also Stephen Meili, 
When Do Human Rights Treaties Help Asylum-Seekers? A Study of Theory and Practice in 
Canadian Jurisprudence Since 1990, 51 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 625 (2014). 
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arguing that their clients should be protected under one or both of 
these legal remedies. But that practice, however beneficial in some 
cases, may have blinded them to the potential benefits of asserting 
constitutional asylum claims in domestic court. There is little 
empirical data, thus far at least, demonstrating that a change in 
practice is warranted. The sample size of reported cases on 
constitutional asylum is far too small for any quantitative analysis 
revealing a statistically significant correlation between constitutional 
asylum and benefits for refugees. On the other hand, qualitative data 
from Latin America, most notably Ecuador, suggests that refugee 
lawyers should consider including constitutional asylum in their 
strategic toolkit.120 
The benefits of constitutional asylum may be particularly salient 
in the two countries whose constitutional asylum provisions were 
analyzed in this article: France and Italy. The relevant constitutional 
provisions in both countries are significantly broader than the 
protection offered through the Refugee Convention: France’s 
Constitution provides for asylum to those who are persecuted for 
activities in pursuit of freedom or for those who seek the protection of 
France “on other grounds.” Italy’s Constitution is nearly as expansive 
in this regard: it provides for asylum to those whose home countries 
deny them the freedoms guaranteed under the Italian Constitution. 
Moreover, The Italian Constitution does not require that an asylum 
applicant show that he or she was individually persecuted, which 
makes it easier to prevail on claims for relief from more generalized 
harm as a result of armed conflict or climate change. Further, the 
French Constitution lacks a domestic law “escape clause” requiring 
enabling legislation that might otherwise limit the scope of asylum 
under the Constitution. Although the Italian Constitution does contain 
such an escape clause, Italy has never passed implementing 
legislation, leaving interpretation of constitutional asylum to the 
domestic courts, which have responded by declaring that 
constitutional asylum is an individual right, enforceable in the civil 
courts of Italy. 
As the previous paragraph makes clear, the text of the French 
and Italian Constitutions suggest a path to a more robust use of 
constitutional asylum. The route through the turbulent political and 
                                                                                                                                  
120. The author is currently conducting research on the use of constitutional asylum in 
Mexico as a means of challenging that country’s draconian policies toward asylum seekers 
from Central America, many of whom are apprehended enroute to the United States. 
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social context in each country may be more difficult, particularly in 
Italy. But it is not impossible. Both countries have relatively 
independent judiciaries, though more so in France than in Italy. 
France also has the advantage of a more enduring legacy of assisting 
refugees, which is manifested in a far more receptive attitude toward 
refugees than in Italy, which is striking, given the political rhetoric 
demonizing refugees in France in recent years, particularly in the 
wake of high profile terrorist attacks there. Each country has an active 
and engaged civil society, featuring several NGOs advocating on 
behalf of refugees and an active immigration and refugee law bar. 
These lawyers and NGOs are frequently part of transnational 
networks of lawyers and other advocates, which enables them to 
leverage resources and expertise when necessary. 
In sum, both the legal and socio-political environment in France 
and Italy would appear to be amenable to an increased utilization of 
constitutional asylum in those countries. As we know from Ecuador, 
it took creative and strategic lawyers operating both within and 
outside that country to devise an effective way to utilize constitutional 
human rights provisions within the national political context in order 
to achieve a result that benefitted their clients. France and Italy surely 
have similar legal talent. The time would seem to be right to 
capitalize on it. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Circling back to the two analytic puzzles identified earlier in this 
article, there are several reasons why constitutional asylum has been 
used very infrequently in those countries where it is on the books. 
Some of these barriers are textual, while others are more a matter of 
practice or habit. As to the former, in some cases the grounds for 
constitutional asylum are actually narrower than under the Refugee 
Convention, such as when it is limited to persecution for the 
expression of a political opinion. In other cases, constitutions 
condition asylum on the terms of domestic law. Such “escape 
clauses” can make constitutional asylum no more robust than asylum 
under the Refugee Convention (and possibly less so). If a state fails to 
enact implementing legislation, the resulting gap in the law can make 
the status of constitutional asylum unclear, and thus less attractive as 
a possible source of protection for refugee lawyers to pursue on 
behalf of their clients. 
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On the more practical side, most lawyers are simply not 
accustomed to utilizing constitutional asylum. This is primarily 
because there is so little jurisprudence on the subject, especially when 
compared to the voluminous amount of case law that has developed 
under the Refugee Convention, in regional and domestic courts. This 
is an example of what Marshall and Hale describe as the inherent 
conservatism of lawyers who, while they may be progressive 
politically, are not likely to take risks when representing their 
individual clients.121 In such situations, lawyers are much more apt 
(and indeed bound as a matter of professional ethics) to pursue 
remedies that have been recognized by domestic courts. 
Despite these barriers, the examples of France and Italy have 
provided at least preliminary answers to the other puzzle posed by 
this article: under what circumstances might constitutional asylum 
become increasingly relevant as a form of protection for refugees? 
Those circumstances are also both textual and practical. On the 
textual side, expansive constitutional provisions that link asylum to 
human rights violations rather than the more specific grounds of 
persecution enumerated in the Refugee Convention, are more likely to 
be utilized by lawyers hoping to expand existing protections for 
asylum-seekers. The lack of an “escape clause”, or at least one that 
has not yet been acted upon by the state, would also seem to be 
conducive to a more robust utilization of constitutional asylum. So 
too are constitutional asylum provisions that do not require the 
applicant to demonstrate that he or she has been individually 
persecuted. In such situations, it is more likely that a refugee can 
prevail on a claim for asylum as a result of flight from an armed 
conflict or environmental disaster. 
On the practical side, at least three factors would appear to make 
constitutional asylum a more viable remedy for refugees in those 
countries where it is available: an independent judiciary; an openness 
toward refugees within the public; and an active civil society that 
includes cause lawyers willing to work strategically within the 
national political and legal context in order to maximize outcomes for 
their clients. 
                                                                                                                                  
121. See Marshall & Hale, supra note 30, at 316 (noting that lawyers and legal 
institutions are conservative, “channeling dissent into narrow and constrained areas dominated 
by those with power and resources”). 
422 FORDHAM INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 41:383 
Further qualitative research in different national contexts will 
allow for additional conclusions about where constitutional asylum is 
more likely to benefit refugees. To the extent that such further 
research reveals that asylum-seekers enjoy greater protections in 
states whose constitutions include a right to asylum, it is likely to 
encourage lawyers and other refugee advocates to mobilize for such a 
right. 
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